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The extra-territorial effects of cartels, mergers and other non-competitive 
activities require consideration especially if they harm consumers and firms in 
developing countries. This paper provides an overview of the available 
empirical literature regarding the impact of cartels, mergers and abuses of 
dominance that are rooted in the OECD. Typically the available evidence is 
not yet sufficiently comprehensive to allow robust conclusions, but (with no 
claim on accuracy), it seems reasonable that the direct impact on developing 
countries is very substantial and in welfare terms may exceed the contribution 
by Official Development Aid. OECD countries could contribute to 
development through the activities of their competition authorities and 
appropriate changes in legislation. 
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What could anti-trust in the OECD do for 
development?1 
1 Introduction 
The relationship between competition policy and development is a rather 
controversial topic. The competition policy community by and large wants to 
stay clear from issues related to development or other policy goals for that 
matter: antitrust should deal with competition only.  The development studies 
community is equally sceptical about at least the strategic value of inclusion of 
competition issues in the multilateral negotiations mainly because of the 
perceived failure of the Washington Consensus that amongst others sees 
privatization, deregulation and competition policy as a necessary element of a 
viable development strategy.  This dichotomy is not really productive, the more 
so since a problem would seem to exist regarding those external effects of anti-
competitive behaviour and concentrations that become only manifest in other 
jurisdictions. Competition policy authorities could be expected to turn a blind 
eye on these effects because it is the negative impact on their compatriots 
(consumers, firms and tax payers) that motivates and legitimizes their actions 
against (hard core) cartels, abuse of dominant positions and mergers and 
acquisitions. 
In this paper I will argue that the extra-territorial effects of cartels, mergers 
and other non-competitive activities require consideration especially if they 
harm consumers and firms in developing countries. An important issue of the 
discussion in this paper is that those competition authorities that in their 
mission statements focus on the benefit of their citizens are missing the point. 
Actually this may be a source of protectionism that needs to be addresses by 
international organizations such as the OECD or the WTO. These are the 
main points of the paper.  
The first section provides arguments for this focus: economic analysis has 
a long tradition of analyzing how (market) power impacts on the international 
division of the gains from trade and developing nations have specific 
characteristics that makes them particularly vulnerable to the abuse of market 
power. This does not mean that the argument implies that only the abuse of 
market power by firms that are located in industrialized countries matter for 
developing countries. In contrast, I would agree with those that are arguing 
that non-OECD cartels and monopolies – both within non-OECD countries 
and organized by non-OECD countries – are very relevant (the OPEC cartel is 
a clear example of the latter). So the reason to focus on the impact that anti-
competitive behaviour in the OECD exerts on the economies of developing 
countries is that this impact has so far hardly been explored in the literature.  
The second section provides an overview of the available empirical literature 
regarding the impact of cartels, mergers and abuses of dominance that are 
                                                 




rooted in the OECD area. Typically, the available evidence is not yet 
sufficiently comprehensive to allow robust conclusions, but the discussion 
provides ample evidence that the OECD countries can contribute to 
development through the activities of their competition authorities and 
through appropriate changes in legislation. The third section draws some 
policy conclusions and suggests issues for future research. 
2 Why should economists study the impact on developing 
countries? 
Research into the potential impact of multinational corporations and 
developed nations on market outcomes in developing countries has a long and 
broadly based tradition in economics ranging from (neo) classical theory via 
(neo) Marxist to business economics. Indeed, Ricardo ([1817] 1962, p. 231) 
already stressed the importance of power for the determination of the division 
of the gains from trade between the motherland and her colonies. At the end 
of the nineteenth century Hobson ([1902] 1988) examined the growing 
economic and political power of large private companies, typically exercised 
over less developed countries. In the 1960s and 1970s proponents of the so 
called dependencia theory related limited scope for growth in the developing 
countries to terms of trade losses due to low income elasticities in the rich 
‘centre’ are low, so that an increase in export volume is associated with terms 
of trade losses (Griffin and Gurley 1985 provide an overview of this literature).  
Noteworthy is that the early UNCTAD rounds in 1968 and 1976 led to the 
adoption by the UN of the ‘Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles 
and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices’. In 1986 the 
OECD dealt with the issue in its ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’. In 
contrast with progress achieved in policy, scientific interest seemed to wane a 
bit. The topic re-emerged on the top of the research agenda again due to the 
introduction of new more pro-competition policies in developing countries 
and emerging markets (Figure 1) that led to a new phase of globalization with 
increases in trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and the number of 
multinational enterprises since the mid 1990s.  
FIGURE 1 




Source: ICN (2005) 
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Modern global value chain analysis, for example, deals with power asymmetries 
focusing on the influence of large firms (typically global buyers) in managing 
and or governing international production networks (see, for example, Gereffi 
et alia 2005). In addition the topic of competition policy and its impact on 
developing countries gained weight due to the fact that it was prominently put 
on the agenda for the Doha trade round (see, for example, Holmes 2004). All 
in all the impact of multinational enterprises and/or explicit and implicit 
organizations of international enterprises on developing countries is a relevant 
determinant of market outcomes and thus worthy of economic research.  
This is the more so since developing countries have a number of 
characteristics that make them relatively vulnerable for abuses of economic 
power. For one thing competition authorities in many developing countries are 
still weak due to lacking resources and manpower, but also because these 
economies often relied on command and control techniques and state 
companies rather than on decentralized production co-ordinated through 
market processes. Typically the number of firms is relatively small 
(concentration consequently is high), firms are in the small and medium 
enterprise (SME) segment and businesses have shallow pockets (all compared 
to an industrialized country). Finally, for many essential products only foreign 
sources exist. Indeed, a foreign firm that operates in developing countries will 
often be dominant in their markets even if this firm is not dominant in its 
home-country, mainly because it will be big and have deep pockets when 
compared to the firms in a developing country or emerging market. Finally, the 
countervailing power of developing nations is quite limited because of their 
relatively small market size. This matters because it is the threat of punitive 
damage that is the incentive to deter and prevent anti-competitive behaviour. 
Indeed, as Budzinski and Kerber (2006, p. 4) point out  
Praktische Erfahrungen unterstützen die Befürchtung auftretender Schutzlücken, 
insbesondere im Hinblick auf Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländer sowie kleine 
Volkswirtschaften die nicht über so bedeutende Binnenmärkte verfügen, als dass 
international agierende Unternehmen nicht notfalls auf einen ungehinderten 
Marktzugang verzichten könnten  
All in all institutional and structural characteristics point to stronger 
susceptibility for the abuse of market power in developing countries.2  
A closer look at the harm done by anti-competitive activities that originate 
in the industrialized world will provide other (semi)-legal evidence that so far 
has not been considered in the mainly macroeconomic (country level) and 
mesoeconomic (sector level) debates. Moreover, the findings that will be 
discussed in this paper have an alternative interpretation. The data that we will 
discuss often derive from investigations and procedures undertaken by 
competition authorities and thus offer a perspective on the external 
international effects of their activities. Indeed, the topic of the extraterritorial 
                                                 
2 In this paper I do not deal with the question whether developing countries should 
pursue a vigorous competition policy or whether it is more appropriate to create 
artificial comparative and competitive advantages for their ‘infant industries’. See, 
however, Singh and Dhumale (1999) and Fox (2007). 
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impact of competition policy is important from a global welfare point. Bernard 
and Ivaldi (2006, p. 17), for example, argue that ‘asymmetry in the distribution 
of consumers and producers or company headquarters across countries drives 
to welfare inefficiency since authorities do not internalize the cross-border 
effects on other jurisdictions’. Typically these asymmetries are largest between 
the developed and the developing countries so that we can learn much from an 
evaluation of the impact on developing countries. Unfortunately competition 
authorities do not report such effects and the next section attempts to fill this 
gap to some extent as it presents available data and discusses the emerging 
empirical literature on this topic. 
3 What can we tell about the direct impact on developing 
countries? 
An increasing number of competition authorities around the world is 
publishing estimates of outcome, that is the harm that was been done by anti-
competitive activities (cartels and abuse of dominance) and the harm that is 
prevented because of the prohibition of those contemplated mergers and 
acquisitions that would reduce welfare (see Don et alia 2008 and Postema et alia 
2006, respectively). Typically the available estimates of competition policy 
outcome that have been reported by competition authorities relate to their own 
national (or in the case of the EU supranational) territory, thus leaving the 
impact on other jurisdictions out of the picture. This is the direct impact of 
anti-competitive behaviour that will be the topic of the remainder of this 
paper. 
It should be noted at the start that the numbers that can presently be 
uncovered for several reasons will underestimate the full impact of 
international anticompetitive practices on developing countries. First we do 
not consider anticompetitive behaviour that originates in developing countries 
and emerging markets. In addition to the neglect of the purely domestic effects 
of domestic cartels (which are not occurring cross border and are thus rightly 
excluded from our set of observations and discussions) this means that South-
South exploitation is neglected.  This may, however, be a relevant source of 
anti competitive activity since both the originating and the source economy will 
typically have weaker competition policy authorities. Second, many anti-
competitive activities are illegal and are hidden on purpose from economic 
detection. Both the duration and the impact on market outcomes of such 
illegal activities require sophisticated detection techniques (compare van 
Bergeijk 2008). Third, sometimes the abuse of dominance and other restrictive 
business practices are not illegal although they are clearly welfare reducing 
from a global point of view. A typical case would be a global buyer that abuses 
its market power only outside the jurisdiction where it is localized (an example 
is the market for cocoa where oligopsonistic and/or monopsonistic power is 
exercised, both at the farm gate and at the international level, see UNCTAD 
2008). Fourth, developing countries may also be hurt indirectly through trade 
barriers in developed countries that were initiated by lobbying and petitioning 
sectors and cartels. Examples are EU and US agricultural subsidies and 
antidumping measures that reduce the market potential of firms located in the 
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developing world.  With these caveats in mind let us consider what we already 
know and where additional research will be needed. 
3.1 The impact of private cartels 
A priori one would expect that it would be most difficult to find data on the 
impact of private cartels. After all private cartels are illegal in the major 
jurisdictions and thus the most serious data difficulties could be expected for 
these often hidden activities. A number of studies, however, have dealt with 
hard core private cartels (that is when firms co-ordinate prices explicitly or 
when they divide up international markets).3  
Scientific interest in international cartels, that is cartels that operate in 
more than one jurisdiction, has especially increased since competition 
authorities in the US and Europe stepped up their cartel-busting activities in 
the 1990s.4  New laws, new (economic) detection instruments and the wide-
ranging application of leniency over the period 1990–2008 uncovered some 
516 international cartels with affected sales of $16 trillion (current prices) and a 
median overcharge ranging between 17% and 21%.5 At the end of 2007 out of 
433 cases 41 were closed and 73 still under investigation.  
The first serious attempt to uncover the impact of private cartels is 
Levenstein et alia (2003). They analyze the impact of 42 successfully prosecuted 
international private hard core cartels on the international trade of developing 
countries in the 1990s (of which $ 55 billion could be related to import 
markets of developing countries). Levenstein et alia conclude.   
if the price of these imports increased an average of ten percent (the lowest 
reported price increase for this sample of cartels), then without adequate 
enforcement against international cartel, producers in industrialized high income 
countries could take from developing countries in higher prices approximately 
15% of what their governments denote in foreign aid.6 
Of course such numbers are surrounded by large uncertainties as Levenstein et 
alia are keen to point out themselves. Taking account of the fact that the 
classification of trade statistics does not always match actual relevant markets 
they estimate a lower bound in which about 2% of import markets in the 
developing world are contaminated. In this case the loss on average would 
                                                 
3 Thus defined these studies do not include the impact of state-run cartels (such as 
OPEC), private export cartels and tacit collusion. 
4 See Connor (2004) on these developments in the world’s major jurisdictions. 
5 All cartel data in this paper (unless otherwise indicated) are from the private 
international cartels PIC dataset published in an independent appendix in Connor 
2008, Tables.1, 2, 3 4 and 8 (these tables provide data for 1990-2008) and an update 
which appears as a set of presentation published through SSRN as Connor (2009) and 
that includes data for 2008 as well. 
6 Note that one of the messages of this paper is that an alternative interpretation of 
these findings exists since these cartels have actually been prosecuted and fined: 
competition authorities in the industrialized world added 15% to the foreign aid 
already supplied to these countries. 
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amount to 0.3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or 5% of Official 
Development Aid (ODA).7 
Also on account of other aspects of their methodology Levenstein et alia are on 
the rather cautious side. First their study only takes into account convictions, 
so that the data only describe activities, impact assessments and periods for 
which legal evidence exists. The requirements for legal evidence, however, may 
be quite different from those for economic evidence. Second, the focus on 
legal evidence leaves cartels out of the picture that were being investigated but 
had not (yet) gone through the legal procedures by 2007. Third, their 
methodology assesses damage on the basis of imported goods only, neglecting 
the impact of cartelized services of which tourism and shipping are examples 
of industries that are numerically very relevant for developing countries. 
Moreover, non competitive pricing of shipping services does not only increase 
consumer prices (through the cost of freight) but also and in addition has a 
negative welfare impact because it reduces substantially the volume of goods 
that are traded internationally (Hummels et alia 2009 estimate a 15% reduction 
for Latin America). 
Fortunately, a Private International Cartels data set (PICDS) has recently 
been constructed (Connor and Helmers 2005) that presently not only covers 
an additional 10 years but also covers cases for which investigations were still 
ongoing by the end of 2008. Over the years 1990–2007 PICDS indicates that 
in terms of affect sales 17% and in numbers 33% of the global cartels relate to 
business and consumer services. PICDS also provides estimates of both the 
mean and the median cartel mark-ups for global cartels. These mark-ups are in 
the order of magnitude of 14 to 21%, considerably larger than ten percent 
increase considered by Lewenstein et alia Moreover, in the years 1990–2007 
according to PICDS about three quarters of affected sales in the discovered 
cases occurred in those cases that had not yet been closed in the sense that 
either fines were imposed, or consent decrees c.q. settlement agreements had 
been reached, or that investigations were closed without punishment.  
Therefore some obvious corrections suggest that the Levenstein 
calculations may underestimate the direct impact by 80 to 90%. With no claim 
on accuracy whatsoever, it seems reasonable that the direct impact on 
developing countries is very substantial indeed and in welfare terms cartel 
damage may exceed the contribution by ODA.8  
Importantly the direct impact of the global cartels on average amounts to 
three quarters of total affected sales in the developing world (Figure 2) whereas 
this share in the US amounts to 31% and in Europe to only 5% (in the world 
total about 14% of the uncovered cartels is of a truly global nature). The 
upshot is that identified damage in developing countries is mainly induced 
outside the jurisdiction, whereas damage is mainly national in Europe and (to a 
lesser extent) in the United States. Indeed, the industrialized world is a 
substantial exporter of cartel damage. This is why competition policy in the  
                                                 
7 Their upper bound assumes that 8.3% of trade is influenced by cartels. This 
translates into an average loss of 1.8% of GDP or the equivalent of 33% of ODA 
flows. 
8 The direct impact could be in the range of 50 to 300% of ODA. 
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OECD countries, if properly focused, could induce substantial welfare gains in 
the developing countries. 
FIGURE 2 
Affected sales of discovered local and global private cartels outside  




























Source: calculations based on the PIC dataset 
 
3.2 Mergers and acquisitions 
The very strong growth of foreign direct investment (consisting of both a 
surge in green field investments and a wave in mergers and acquisitions) that 
occurred in the decade before the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis has given 
rise to many concerns that the increase in foreign market power could hurt 
developing countries (see, for example UNCTAD 2000). Singh and Dhumale 
(1999, p. 5) remark that 
Whether the mergers take place in the US or Europe or through cross border 
takeovers in developing countries themselves, there are serious competition 
policy concerns for developing countries. If the largest producers in, say, the US 
automobile industry merge, this may not only lead to anti-competitive behaviour 
in the US but also similar or worse behaviour in developing countries 
Typically many mergers in the past have created market power and led to 
substantial increases in prices in a significant share of the cases. Gugler et alia 
(2003) in their review of 45.000 mergers in the period 1981–1998 identify 
about a third of the mergers as non-competitive cases in which market power 
increases alongside an increase in profits and a decrease in sales volume. It is 
not known whether the merging firms had a negative impact on buyers outside 
the jurisdiction of the competition authority that has judged the merger and 
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whether these mergers were actually accepted for this reason. Moreover data 
are not available on the actual impact on developing countries.  
It would, however, seem possible to use the approach set out by the study on 
cartel damage by Levenstein et alia (2003) that was discussed in the previous 
subsection. This would require disaggregation (for example of the Gugler 
dataset) by product group and/or industry type and to relate this to imports by 
developing countries. Typically one would additionally also want to classify 
incoming Foreign Direct Investment by product group because mergers may 
influence how FDI impacts the host country’s economy. Haller (2009), for 
example, relates concentration in industries with strong FDI activity to the 
impact that multinational players have on markets that they enter. In addition 
from a development perspective some non-economic effects may be relevant, 
such as distributional consequences and the division of costs and benefits both 
between capital (shareholders) and labour (workers). Another relevant issue is 
the division of costs and benefits between countries, i.e. where the merging 
firms are located and the profits ultimately will be reaped and where the 
products are being consumed (Singh 2002, p.12). These highly relevant 
questions are left for future research.  
It is probably true that cross border mergers and acquisitions could best 
be dealt with through appropriate legislation and institutions within the 
developing world (an example is the Malawi review of the merger of local 
subsidiaries of Total and Mobil in 2005, see Brusick and Evenett 2008, p. 288). 
Unfortunately it is doubtful whether competition authorities could make a 
difference for the impact of cross border FDI. Indeed, even though the share 
of developing countries in global cross border mergers and acquisitions 
increased slightly in recent years, it remained below about 15% (Figure 3).  
Also in this sense the merger review by competition authorities in the OECD 
is expected to be very relevant for developing countries. 
FIGURE 3 









Developing countries Developed countries
 
Source: calculations based on UNCTAD World Investment Report 2008, Table II.1 
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All in all it is clear that further research is still needed before we can really 
understand how mergers, acquisitions, merger review and competition policies 
in the OECD influence prices and market conditions in developing countries 
and emerging markets. 
3.3 Abuse of dominance and other restrictive business 
practices 
As stated before no a priori reason exists why domestic firms could not exert an 
equally detrimental impact on market outcomes in developing countries, but 
for the context of this paper the focus is mainly on foreign firms that act anti-
competitive. Typically it is difficult to get data on the involvement of firms 
located in other jurisdictions and/or foreign owned firms as this nationality 
and ownership generally speaking are not reported by competition authorities.  
Some evidence of the frequency of the abuse of dominance by foreign 
firms can be gleaned from research based on events data in this field.9 About 
32% of all reported anti competitive practice allegations in Latin America and 
the Caribbean for the years 2004–2005 (Clarke et alia 2005, Table 4) and about 
23% in Sub Saharan Africa in the years 1995–2004 (Evenett et alia 2006, Table 
7) relate to abuse of dominance, predatory pricing, tying and so on, by 
explicitly mentioned foreign firms or subsidiaries. This at least suggests that the 
phenomenon is empirically relevant.  
In addition recent studies document specific cases. Adam and Adler 
(2008, pp. 585–6 and 608–9) discuss exclusive dealing arrangement of Coca 
Cola in Zambia and Kenya, predatory pricing by Metro in Zambia and abuse 
of market dominance by Microsoft in South Korea. Brisick and Evenett. (2008, 
pp. 283–86) discuss the refusal to provide essential facilities by Telefónica in 
Peru, excessively restrictive conditions on local dairy- and farm-product 
suppliers enacted by Carrefour and Tesco in Hong Kong and Thailand and 
excessive prices imposed by large pharmaceutical firms in many developing 
countries.  
Although case law thus exists, typically economic damage has not been 
estimated in these cases. So the available evidence is not sufficient to come up 
with a comprehensive estimate of the harm done to developing countries. It is 
noteworthy that sometimes estimates exist for specific sectors that suggest 
substantial costs of anti-competitive activities by foreign (and often 
multinational) enterprises.10 
                                                 
9 Such data are typically identified on the basis reporting in the media. 
10 For example, analyzing international price discrimination by the pharmaceutical 
industry for a sample of 32 countries of which 16 are developing countries, Schut and 
van Bergeijk (1986)  have estimated that indirect and direct price control could reduce 
prices by 15–20% See also Hummels et alia 2009 on price discrimination in 
international shipping. 
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4 Conclusions and future research 
The empirical findings that we discussed in this paper can and should by their 
very nature not be considered to be conclusive. At the same time the 
discussion in the previous sections indicates that competition policy authorities 
could exert a strong and positive influence on market outcomes in developing 
countries. It is worth emphasizing that competition authorities to some extent 
are actually already doing so. The positive international externalities of 
competition policy that have been reaped in the field of international cartels 
over the years 1990–2008 are substantial and may exceed the contribution of 
more traditional instruments of development such as aid. Indeed it is 
undoubtedly beneficial for global welfare that competition authorities in the 
OECD have ‘in-sourced’ supervision on global markets thus reducing welfare 
losses in the developing world. 
At the same time it should be noted that the institutional context in the 
OECD itself needs improvement in order to solve negative competition 
externalities that typically are located at the interface of trade and competition. 
Three relevant issues that need to be dealt with in the OECD are export 
cartels, the positive appreciation of international terms of trade gains in merger 
procedures and the replacement of anti-dumping trade policy instruments by 
normal competition policy procedures. As to export cartels, Evenett et alia 
(2001, Table 3) provide an overview of countries that allow national 
exemptions to competition law for exporters, including amongst others 
Canada, Germany, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Regarding the inadequacy of merger procedures Röller et alia (2006, p. 
137) point out that merger evaluation procedures in Canada, France, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom do consider improved ‘international competitiveness’ 
(for example, price increases that occur in other jurisdictions) as an essentially 
positive aspect of the merger).11 With respect to the use of anti-dumping 
measures as a tool to increase the costs of market entrants by incumbent firms, 
the catching up of some emerging market economies is worrying (Knorr, 2004 
and Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2008). From a global point of view these 
essentially anti-competitive activities increase inefficiency and thus reduce 
welfare. Competition policy authorities in the OECD could play a vital role 
providing the arguments and data in the debate on these changes that will 
benefit development (and incidentally also their own consumers and firms) 
While this paper thus provided some of the pieces of puzzle, the most 
important contribution is to show that pieces are still missing. In this sense one 
relevant conclusion is that it is important to design and provide reporting 
mechanisms that make it possible to generate information on matters that are 
essentially empirical in nature. It would make sense if these reporting 
requirements are allocated to the industrialized countries. Typically the 
existence and scope of export cartels as well as the extra territorial effects of 
                                                 
11 This contrasts strongly with the following quote from (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 
2002, p. 10): ‘antitrust methodologies generally make no mention of the nationality of 
the firms or products – what matters is whether business practices that have an effect 
on market outcomes reduce efficiency and (that) this is not offset by dynamic 
benefits’. 
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mergers and acquisitions should be reported to the relevant international 
organizations such as the ICN, the OECD or UNCTAD in order to be able to 
judge whether the international policy framework needs change. Of course 
there is a cost involved in data collection, but in the end providing objective 
data could help the advocacy for a global set of rules on restrictive business 
practices that strengthens competition and increases welfare in the developed 
and developing world. 
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